No doubt one could highlight a handful of reasons, ranging from the limited access to information on implementation initiatives to the difficulty of identifying the participants in the post-adjudicative phase, especially in the case of AOs, 4 and so forth. Yet the crux of the matter is that the quid of post-adjudication proves hard to pinpoint in view of a conceptual framework suitable for identifying follow-up actions within the bundle of conduct surrounding an ICJ judgment or an AO. And, what is more, the fall-back on notions such as compliance or execution is unlikely to resolve the deadlock. It is no coincidence, in fact, if the 'ironic' neglect hinted by Sir Robert Jennings persists for certain aspects of post-adjudication which remains distant from the familiar backyard of compliance. Indeed, the means of implementation are the object of a political choice and, as such, traditionally outside the fence of legal analysis on post-adjudication, 5 whereas the follow-up to A Os hardly fits with the classic understanding of compliance. Together, these observations suggest that the very notion of implementation needs some in-depth rethinking.
To begin with, it is of note that we rarely think of implementation independently from compliance. The two terms are employed almost interchangeably in connection with the 'post-adjudicative phase'. More precisely, 'implementation' is held to comprise all the actions that may facilitate or result in compliance, while compliance itself indicates the 'state of conformity or ·• Jean Salmon speaks of the difficulty of identifying the 'Court's audience', see Jean Salmon, "Quels sont les destinataires des avis", International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons in eds. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (Cambridge University Press, 1999), at 28-35. 5 Overall, it has been noticed that the enforcement of international judgments relies on the same mechanisms providing for the enforcement of any kind of international law obligation. Hence, the matter acquires a political rather than a legal character. On this point, see Edvard Hambro, L'execution des sentences internationales (Recueil Sirey, 1935) , at 47; Constantin Vulcan, "L'execution des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice d'apres la Charte des Nations Unies" (1947) 51 RGDIP 187; Shabtai Rosenne, "L'execution et la mise en vigueur des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice" (1953) 57 RGDIP 532; Ehran Tuncel, L'execution des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice selon la Charte des Nations Unies (Messeiller, 1960) , at 16, 60; Pasquale Paone, "Considerazioni sull'esecuzione delle sentenze della Corte internazionale di Giustizia" XIV Comunicazioni e studi (1975), at 632; Gilbert Guillaume, "Avant-Propos" in Azar, L'execution des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice, at xv. A similar observation was also made by the Committee of Jurists charged with the task of elaborating the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
As they observed, "(i)t was not the business of the Court to ensure the executions of its decisions", see Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, vol. 4, at 853 .
identity between an actor's behaviour and a specified rule'. 6 Hence, the obligation of execution is taken as the backbone of implementation. Attention gravitates towards the parties and what they do after the pronouncement, with little interest for anything happening before or with the involvement of other subjects. Odd as it may seem, this same conception of implementation has been extended to AOs. While offering different grounds for the obligation to execute AOs/ authors unanimously equate implementation with compliance. No matter the type of pronouncement, implementation is thus seen as a function of compliance. Yet, this does not necessarily cover all scenarios. There may be acts that do not necessarily end in -or end withcompliance, but are nonetheless related to the post-adjudicative phase of an ICJ pronouncement.
This may arise, for instance, when there is no compliance notwithstanding the implementation efforts thereto. One of the parties may, in fact, refuse to engage in the conduct previously agreed upon; circumstances may change so as to alter the balance of interests among the parties or attempts to seek a different solution for their divergences and so forth. A grey area exists also when implementation produces practical and legal effects beyond the mere realization of the pronouncement. This happens particularly when implementation paves the way for the accommodation of broader issues between the parties, such as certain ICJ judgments concerning territorial disputes. In addition, one could think of conduct more remotely related to compliance and yet crucial to implementation. Examples range from the conclusion of agreements on the means to resolve frictions in the course of implementation, to the creation of organs or entities with monitoring or other implementation-related tasks. 8 While compliance still lies in the background, these 6 See Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations and Compliance" Handbook of International Relations (SAGE 2002) , in eds. Waiter Carlasnes et al., at 538, 539. The same authors define implementation as 'the process of putting international commitments into practice: the passage of legislation, creation of institutions (both domestic and international) and enforcement rules. Implementation is typically a critical step towards compliance, but compliance can occur without any effort or action by the government'. Similarly, see also (Giuffe, 1985) . In a similar vein, Michla Pomerance,
The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U.N. Years (John Hopkins
University Press, 1974) , at 341 -367,371. Others have found an obligation of execution to arise in case the requesting organ voluntarily accepts an AO, see Philippe Weckel, "Les suites des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice" (1996) XLII AFDI 428. 8 For more details concerning specific cases, see Sections II and Ill. initiatives in themselves are aimed at facilitating or can lead to implementation, which is neither theoretically nor practically the same as compliance.
So how should one deal with such conduct? Even broadly conceived, compliance fails to account for their relevance in post-adjudication. Realizing the pronouncement, in fact, is not necessarily the goal they pursue. Yet, if compliance is partly insufficient, some sort of orientation is still needed to sail the vast sea of diplomatic practice potentially surrounding an ICJ pronouncement. Some help may come from the change of perspective implicit in looking at the behaviour of the parties rather than exclusively at the pronouncement. Their acts have legal relevance if taken not only for the immediate realization of the Court's legal ascertainment, but also for the effective functioning of international law. As any normative system, international law endeavours at assuring the containment and avoidance of disputes, with the term 'dispute' here broadly indicating a clash of interests between international law subjects. These two objectives are not always met concomitantly with or exclusively through compliance; however, it still seems reasonable to consider the conduct as fostering either of these goals as part of the implementation process.
Accordingly, implementation comprises those acts which go beyond or diverge from compliance, but contribute to the resolution of a dispute not fully resolved, whether because of the Court's limited jurisdiction or because of its reluctance to address some of the aspects relevant in casu. When ensuing from a diplomatic initiative, such acts will come under the scope of our analysis. The same goes for the efforts to accommodate the interests of States indirectly affected by a pronouncement, for instance in cases of territorial delimitations or of multilateral treaty interpretation. These examples also highlight the importance of implementation for the prevention of future disputes, in addition to the resolution of the existing ones. As a last point of illustration, one could recall those initiatives -like the establishment of monitoring bodies -aimed at channelling and cooling-off the persisting clashes of interest so as to prevent their escalation in a decentralized setting.
Consequently, measuring compliance with ICJ judgments and AOs will not be the core of our analysis. Rather, we will seek to identify the conduct, initiatives and mechanisms taken in conjunction with a pronouncement and which contribute to the effective functioning of internationallaw. 9 This also entails a twofold shift in the focus of attention, classically centred on the actions taken after the pronouncement by those who have an obligation to execute it. On the one hand, we will in fact consider the initiatives taken by the parties in collaboration with the Court and, on the other hand, we will look at the different deals concluded before the pronouncement for its implementation. Our attention will thus essentially gravitate towards the dialogue between the Court and its 'audience'.
Admittedly, such a broad approach could be criticised for being too porous or loose. Yet, concentrating narrowly on compliance is unlikely to offer a less slippery path of investigation. Several commentators have stressed the difficulty of measuring compliance with judgments owing to the complexity of most domestic processes designed to realize compliance, 10 to the difference between States' statements and their deeds, as well as to certain time factors.U In the case of AOs, these difficulties seem even more daunting, as suggested by the lack of empirical investigations on this issue. What is more, a sound investigation on implementation cannot ignore that the addressees of -and, more broadly, the subjects affected by -an ICJ pronouncement may pursue goals collateral to compliance. It is submitted that such acts are legally relevant for implementation if they contribute to the containment of existing tensions and avoid the insurgence of new ones. With this framework in mind, let us now turn to the implementation of the ICJ judgments first and of its AOs next.
II. Every Drop Makes an Ocean: The Efforts Towards Implementing ICJ Judgments
Implementation is usually broached from the perspective of the pronouncement, rather than from that of the parties. An international lawyer would, in fact, most probably ask what is required to implement a given decision, rather than what is its surrounding context. Most classifications relating to implementation -for instance, the famous distinction between declaratory and constitutive pronouncements -rely on certain proprieties inherent to a judgment, likewise its impact on previous and future legal situations or its subject matter. Yet there may be a risk of overlooking that the course of post-adjudication is ultimately determined by the will of the parties. It is for them to embed the 'juridical component' within their 10 In this respect, Llamzon stresses particularly the hurdle of keeping track of and inferring determinative conclusions from the domestic process aimed at compliance, notably as far as federal systems are concerned. In the context of a dispute, pragmatism is central to the relationship between the parties. The quest for some form of change in the allocation of interests, coupled with the informational asymmetries to which both parties are subject, brings a certain dose of uncertainty. The pre or post adjudicative initiatives reflect the pragmatic attempt to adjust to actual, as well as potential, changes in the circumstances surrounding a dispute. By illustrating this, we will try to highlight the main features of implementation by the parties to a decision. Upon seizing the Court, 12 the parties clearly know they ought to execute the decision to come. However, an express reference to implementation before adjudication can mitigate some of the hurdles potentially looming over the horizon. Clauses on implementation may figure either in the special agreements conferring jurisdiction upon the Court or in other instruments adopted prior to the proceedings. 13 This enhances the mutual confidence between the parties, pushing the oft-costly process of dispute resolution, as witnessed in a number of heavily charged cases, particularly delimitation cases.
14 Conversely, absent a clearly expressed engagement, implementation may prove arduous if positive acts of cooperation are needed. In the context of the Asylum case, for instance, the lack of a solid framework for implementation in the Act of Lima turned to be highly detrimental for implementation. 15 Practically, implementation clauses set the overall framework for the future diplomatic actions to follow the decision. To this end, they often simply foresee the initiation of negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement in accordance with the pronouncement, 16 while at times they even single out and establish how to deal with aspects potentially thwarting compliance. In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), for instance, since the parties feared a stalemate in demarcation, they decided a precise time limit for it and asked the Court to nominate three experts in charge of this objective.
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In a similar vein, States have occasionally concluded agreements or clauses addressing certain aspects parallel or indirectly related to the core of the dispute under adjudication. Particularly recurrent in connexion with the 14 For instance, the conclusion of a package-deal touching upon issues of implementation were fundamental to avoid the worsening of the dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua (Arbitral Award case 19 Overall, these agreements aim at avoiding the impairment of the parties' respective rights pending adjudication, contributing to maintain a climate as favourable as possible to future negotiations on implementation. 20 In sum, under their continuous interaction, the parties take certain diplomatic actions which impact upon implementation even before the judgment is rendered. These actions fix a framework for cooperating after the decision.
Turning to the post-adjudicative phase, the locus par excellence of implementation, we enter a phase in which inter-party negotiations come again to the fore in order to decide how to practically execute the judgment and, ultimately, to what degree it is to be upheld. After adjudication, though, the resumed bilateral relationship between the parties comprises an authoritative 'juridical component'. This blend of a 'diplomatic' and a 'juridical' component determine the main trends of implementation.
At the outset, a clarification is in place concerning the stances that can be taken in respect of the pronouncement. acting consensually, the parties can accept and execute the judgment; completely or partially depart from it; or take actions exceeding the obligation to execute it. On the contrary, lacking agreement, the losing State may contest the judgment, but finally act in accordance with it or, conversely, act inconsistently with it. In response to that, the winning State can, provided it wishes to take action, try to negotiate an alternative solution or seek to unilaterally enforce the judgment notwithstanding its wholesale rejection. Needless to say, the parties dispose of all the usual diplomatic means to reach an agreement, be that bilaterally, with the intervention of one or more third State(s) 21 or of an international entity. Not surprisingly, most of the accessible practice falls under the first scenario, corresponding to compliance as classically understood. This explains the general optimism towards compliance records. 22 In line with our previous remarks, the negotiation of implementation provisions and other similar clauses before adjudication has smoothened the process of execution, culminating either in the conclusion of a formal agreement2 3 or in other 21 forms of official endorsement of the judgment. 24 Exceptions to that are, for instance, the Arbitral Award and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros cases. Whereas the diplomatic difficulties following the Arbitral A ward pronouncement were eventually resolved,2 5 the same cannot be said for the GabcikovoNagymaros dispute. Negotiations have largely been unfruitful,2 6 for the changes in the political climate after the pronouncement have dwarfed the relevance of previous agreements concluded by the parties. Successful implementation agreements or other diplomatic actions have proved possible also in the absence of a pre-agreed framework for implementationY
Executing the terms of a judgment, though, is not the only option of consensual follow-up existing in practice. At times, States have agreed either to depart from the terms of the pronouncement or to take action not strictly required by it. In truth, only in one instance-namely, in the fan Mayen casethe parties have decided to slightly modify the terms of the judgment; on the contrary, States have more frequently taken efforts that exceed the obligation to execute the pronouncement. For instance, the Court's Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land pronouncement catalysed new efforts in delimiting certain areas upon which the Court had not ruled, thereby settling points of future potential contrast between the parties. 28 Another example is provided by the international agency created by Senegal and Guinea Bissau for the joint exploitation of a disputed maritime zone, part of which had made the object of the Arbitral Award ICJ decision. 29 This initiative proved crucial for compliance for it allowed addressing certain vital economic aspects not comprised by the Court's mandate. Other examples, though not of a purely inter-State character, can be found in the Land and Maritime Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) as well as in the Pulp Mills case, 30 which will be discussed when dealing with the role of lOs in implementation.
Leaving aside the realm of consensual execution, on several occasions the judgments of the Court have been contested by one of the concerned parties. To be precise, it is prudent to distinguish between the cases in which the parties have formally protested against the judgment, but ultimately acted compatibly with it, from those in which the judgment has been rejected and the dispute finally settled otherwise than in the pronouncement. Under the first label, one may include the Hostages case inasmuch as the Algiers Accordswhich provided a comprehensive framework for settling the Iran-US dispute -ultimately realized the actions indicated by the Court, even though the agreements hardly mentioned the pronouncement. On the contrary, not even a remote echo of the ICJ's voice can be heard in cases of wholesale rejection, such as the Fisheries Jurisdiction, Nicaragua and, for a long period of time, Corfu Channel pronouncements. Against the refusal to engage in implementation, the concerned States have reacted differently. Attempts at enforcement were made in relation to the Corfu Channel and the Nicaragua pronouncements, respectively, through unilateral action and institutional mechanisms. 31 In both cases, though, the overall political contingencies, added to the complete lack of cooperation on the side of the debtor State, made such attempts nugatory. On the contrary, a more successful attempt can be seen in the strategy of the UK regarding Iceland's unwillingness to accept the Fisheries Jurisdiction decision. After several efforts at enforcement, the UK desisted from further insisting on the pronouncement and concluded a provisional agreement ensuring at least part of the UK's interests.
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In light of this global overview, a 'diplomatic' and a 'juridical' component seems to permeate the post-adjudicative phase. The prominence of the former stresses the relativity of the res judicata, whose content can be modified by the parties either fully consensually or as the result of a pragmatic accommodation of interests imposed by one party's rejection of the pronouncement. Yet, this does not deprive the 'juridical component' of any relevance for implementation; rather it calls for reflection on its role in directing the process of dispute resolution. In this vein, the pronouncement first of all offers a sort of authoritative benchmark for measuring the legitimacy of each party's claim during negotiations on implementation. 33 Additionally, the commitment to abide by the judgment may help justifying certain actions likely to raise discontent domestically, thereby reducing the political costs of dispute resolution. 34 Finally, with regard to implementation efforts going beyond compliance, the pronouncement can also provide a framework for diplomatic initiatives addressing the overall dispute between the parties. In this way, the 'diplomatic component' compensates for the partiality of the res judicata by embedding part of its content, or at least its spirit, in the settlement of aspects not adjudicated by the Court. 35 Together, these factors bring to light the manifold nuances of implementation and suggest recalibrating our attention from the result of execution stricto sensu to the process of negotiation related thereto. From this perspective, implementation efforts are to be assessed not only in terms of 32 compliance, but also of their effectiveness in resolving the dispute existing between the parties.
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First and foremost, a clarification as to the temporal aspect of implementation is in order. Length is probably one of the first aspects which springs to mind thinking about implementation. Burdensome and long negotiations easily lower expectations of effectiveness. Yet the length of negotiations in itself tells little if merely calculated from when the decision has been handed down. One needs, in fact, considering at which stage the pronouncement enters the relationship between the parties and, more generally, what is the broader legal context at the time of adjudication and after. In this vein, a pronouncement on a situation not sufficiently clear in its factual implications will most likely result in being hard to implement. 37 The same could be thought of a pronouncement which touches upon legal issues subject to structural change: this state of fluctuation will probably reverberate in implementation, with the most extreme case being a pragmatic settlement different from the one decided by the Court.
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In addition, the effective resolution of a dispute depends on the straightforwardness of the Court's pronouncement. Often, with a too open-ended pronouncement -take the Asylum!Haya de la Torre or the GabcikovoNagimaros pronouncements -the 'juridical component' has only marginally directed the expectations and claims of the parties. This having been said, one cannot but admit the contingent character of the very concept of effective resolution, as conflict over a certain issue can always resurge, notwithstanding any previous effective resolution thereof.
The cause of these hurdles, though, often resides in a lack of means, rather than of will, on the part of .the concerned States. Third parties can help mitigate this deficiency and therefore have a role in implementation. Effective implementation will then have to be assessed looking at actors other than States, notably IOs and the Court itself. 36 It is important to note that, according to certain authors, the very notion of execution could be stretched so as to comprise not only cases of compliance stricto sensu, but 
B. Institutional Actors and Their Support for Implementation
Various institutional actors have occasionally intervened in the implementation of the ICJ judgments. Contrary to what one may think, lOs have for a long time been relatively timid in this respect. Emblematic is the case of the United Nations (UN), which has exhibited an inability to fully use the enforcement powers enjoyed by the Security Council under article 94(2) of the Charter. 39 A more active involvement has proved possible with the abandoning of a purely enforcement optic, which hardly suits the flexible and largely consensual framework of implementation.
40 lOs are, in fact, well-positioned to provide a framework for negotiation and cooperation, as well as to offer practical support for States engaged in implementation. The examples in this respect are numerous and concern both universal and regional lOs.
As a framework for cooperation, lOs allow for reducing the costs of communication between the parties, thereby expediting the course of negotiations vis-a-vis implementation. 41 In addition, lOs can be directly involved 0 The unilateral character of enforcement measures clashes with the margin of appreciation left to the parties in the implementation of a judgment and an imposed solution, similarly to forced initiatives taken by one of the parties only, is unlikely to bring about effective compliance, especially inasmuch as domestic action is necessary to realize the judgment. In a similar vein, Weckel, "Les suites des decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice", at 438. "' For instance, a few months after the Pulp Mills pronouncement the parties succeeded in establishing a joint environment monitoring program to be pursued under the framework of the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU). On the 30 of August in implementation, playing a role somewhat in between that of a conciliator and a mediator as regards the parties. Of this type, first chronologically is the intervention of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the context of the territorial dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua. Having followed the situation since its inception, 42 the OAS, through its Inter-American Peace Committee, interceded in the post-adjudicative phase to help overcoming the stalemate in demarcation due to pending issues of nationality and of acquired rights. 43 More recently, the UN ushured a similar intervention in connection with the Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria) case. 44 After the pronouncement, the UN Secretary General (SG) alertly convened a meeting with the parties. 45 In that occasion, The Heads of States of the two countries decided to establish a mixed commission, principally in charge of implementing the judgment, but also competent for demarcating the land and maritime boundary and for protecting the rights of the populations affected by the verdict. 46 In both these cases, the diplomatic initiatives taken in the post-adjudication period went beyond compliance, with the aim of resolving certain issues crucial to extinguishing the respective disputes. In truth, these points could hardly have made the object of adjudication strictly speaking; it suffices to think about the question of nationality, or that of straddling villages and the relocation thereof. On the contrary, reliance on diplomatic means seemed more promising. Interestingly, the means produced for smooth implementation exhibit certain hybrid traits if compared with the classical means of diplomatic dispute settlement. For instance, in the Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), the UN acted more pervasively than a conciliator, but lacked the complete freedom of a mediator, since negotiations had to be carried in accordance with the ICJ judgment and of international law in general. This hints at the mutual supportiveness between the 'juridical' and the 'diplomatic' component. While the decision of the Court provides a framework of reference, diplomatic negotiation is necessary to handle issues which could be detrimental for the efficacy of the pronouncement. The presence of lOs reduces the costs of cooperation, correlatively making free-riding or defection by one party more burdensome. This is important in the first stages of interaction, especially if there is a lack of mutual trust between the parties.
In addition to supporting negotiation, lOs have also supplied financial and logistical assistance. A few, yet quite articulated, standing financing mechanisms exist both at the universal and the regional level. The most prominent one is the UN Trust Fund, established in 1989 to ensure financial support for States bringing a dispute before the ICJ on a consensual basis. 49 50 Yet this has not discouraged the AOS from setting up a similar mechanism at the regionallevel. 51 Differently than the UN twin, the AOS Peace Fund can be utilized only for delimitation cases, to provide either financial or technical support -the latter through the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History. Up to now, the Fund has sponsored implementation activities only in the Land and Maritim e Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras).
Passing on to a more political kind of assistance, a rather unique example is that of a UN observer mission -UNASOG -created to monitor the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Aouzou Strip. 5 2 A UN presence to act with a joint team of officials from both countries had already been envisaged in the Agreement concluded by the parties to assure compliance with the judgment. Acting upon this basis, the SG had proposed the deployment of an observer unit, to remain in place until Libya's complete withdrawal from the Aouzou Strip. 53 Quite tellingly, the creation ofUNASOG is the only instance in which a UN political organ has taken action in view of facilitating implementation. The failure to take enforcement actions as envisaged by the Charter has turned into a deadlock for political organs. Particularly regrettable is, in this respect, the AG's inability to exploit creatively the broad powers entrusted to it by Article 10 of the UN Charter.
While IOs have variously contributed to implementation, the ICJ has also not completely abstained from the implementation process. The Court, while at times recalling the parties' obligation to execute its judgments, 54 has refrained from indicating the means of implementation, since doing so 55 Such reluctance notwithstanding, the Court has indeed played a role in the context of implementation. To begin with, the parties themselves have occasionally bestowed upon it certain tasks in implementation. 56 Additionally, the Court has also called upon the parties to undertake negotiations -whether by asserting an explicit obligation or by merely recommending to do so -in view of implementing its pronouncement.
As it appears, any actual involvement in implementation is down to the will of the parties and is, therefore, subject to their own strategy for dealing with potential threats against compliance. Instead, the Court's motu proprio reference to diplomatic means hints at a different way of supporting the latter process. When referring to negotiations, the Court has indeed provided clues as to the content thereof. This is, admittedly, nothing special if the parties are found to have a legal obligation to undertake negotiations or other forms of diplomatic cooperation and the Court expounds on the general principles relevant thereto. 57 On the contrary, less orthodox is the case of recommendations indicating some sort of practical approach to be sought during negotiations 58 55 Haya de la Torre. There the Court stated that it was 'unable to give any practical advice as to the various courses which might be followed with a view to terminating the asylum, since, by doing so, it would depart from its judicial function. 56 In the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the parties had agreed-under Article 3 of the Special Agreement -to return to the Court for binding clarifications if they had not been able to reach an agreement within three months from the decision. In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) , the parties had asked the Court to nominate three experts to assist them in the operation of demarcation, see article IV of the special agreement conferring jurisdiction upon the Court. Finally, in the Gabcikovo-Nagimaros case, the parties had agreed that, were they to fail in finding agreement within six months from the decision, "either Party may request the Court to render an additional judgment to determine the modalities for executing its Judgment", see or exhorting one or both parties to take a certain course of action. 59 The latter approach has been criticized by some for being extraneous to the Court's judicial function. 60 Moreover, the Court's tendency to recommend and, eventually, seek to influence negotiations raises a question of judicial strategy: why and when should the Court adopt such a course of action?
First and foremost, it is important to recall that this somewhat 'transactional' logic has always featured alongside the more classical logic of 'juris dicere'; in other words, the pragmatic solutions proposed by the Court have added to, rather than superseded, the legal findings made by it. This suggests a stratification of goals in the Court's approach towards its function at the international level and, more precisely, interplay between the goal of effectively resolving a certain dispute and that of laying down the law. In the latter respect, it has been noticed that the Court tends to lay more emphasis on either objective according to the context of adjudication: if it perceives that the terms of its own pronouncement may spur further frictions between the parties or that its findings fall short of addressing some relevant aspects of the dispute at stake, it will likely be proactive in directing the course of post-adjudication. 61 This suggests the Court may engage in 'preventive' or 'remedial' diplomacy.
62 Diplomatic means are, in fact, invoked either to prevent new differences arising or to somehow remedy the Court's inability to address and resolve certain important aspects of the dispute, be that because of its limited competence or because the applicable law was in flux. 59 In Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v 
Ill. Overlapping Layers: The Institutional and Relational Dimensions of the Implementation of ICJ Advisory Opinions
While much has been said about the nature of the advisory competence of the ICJ, implementation is a less discussed topic among internationallawyers. 63 Yet it has been noticed that the implementation of A Os is a "field where the Court's suasion powers face an even greater test" 64 than in the case of judgments. And understandably so, since AOs insert within the institutional framework of an IO a 'juridical component' which, while generally lacking binding force, 65 nonetheless entail a full-fledged legal ascertainment akin to that exercised by the Court under its contentious jurisdiction. 66 As such, AOs may bear upon the legal situation not only of the requesting organ, but also of the Member States of the organization qua individual subjects or of nonMember States, depending on the particular demand.
For the purposes of implementation, this means that AOs could trigger action by a handful of subjects, with the risk of further blurring what should be followed-up. To mitigate this hurdle, one should focus on the web of legal interests involved at the 'institutional' as well as at the 'relational' level of the life of IOs. 67 Starting from the position of the requesting IO as the initial point of reference, two main scenarios are possible. The requesting IO can either have a direct interest in the question posed by the Court -because the conduct of one of its organs is at stake 68 or because it holds a right or an obligation towards one or more of its member States 69 -or it can be a 'third party' where the legal ascertainment by the Court has no direct bearing on the IO, but touches upon the legal position of its member States or of nonmember States.
70
Why are these different scenarios likely to impact on implementation? Fundamentally, because they allow for the prediction of its main dynamics, particularly as far as the potential role of the institutional machinery of 68 the IO is concerned. Indeed, when the requesting IO has an interest of its own in the AO, implementation will primarily take place -and be shaped by -the institutional dimension. On the one hand, in fact, the ascertainment made by the Court will identify the law applicable to a situation where the organization is directly concerned, e.g. saying whether a certain conduct is legal or not, or whether a certain right exists or not. On the other hand, the organization will be able, through its institutional machinery, to take some autonomous action. The AO can fully be complied with, since the requesting organ can either decide to take certain implementing actions itself or it can prompt another organ(s) to do so. Somewhat different, though, is the situation of quasi-contentious cases, i.e. those in which the organization holds a right or an obligation vis-a-vis its member States. The presence of one or more individual States with their own interests calls for a focus on both the institutional and the relational dimension, since action or inaction could take place at any of them, and it is the interplay between the two that will finally shape implementation. The 'duality' inherent in the position of States within an IO -being as they are both members of the 10 and independent subjects-is even more prominent in the implementation of A Os which do not determine either the legality of a conduct of the organization, or the existence of a right or an obligation of its own. This situation is different from the previous one in two main respects. First, the AO will not per se have binding force for the requesting IO, simply because the Court's legal ascertainment will not concern -at least not immediately -its legal position. This means, in turn, that the AO will entail some form of obligation for the organization only if the organization upholds, acknowledges or decides to act according to the pronouncement. Secondly, and even more importantly, the IO will not have the capacity to autonomously ensure compliance, some forms of action always being necessary on the part of one or more individual States. In other words, whereas the 10 can take steps towards implementation, the effectiveness thereof will ultimately depend on the independent initiatives of the member States. In similar situations, one may expect the relational and the institutional aspect to be deeply entrenched with one another, up to the point of diluting implementation in the continuous relationship between the institutional machinery of the IO and its member States qua individual subjects.
Having this framework in mind, we will first look at the main features of implementation at each of these two dimensions in turn. A rich and eminently institutional implementation practice will be brought to light, challenging the common skepticism about the implementation of AOs. Again, this hints at a new perspective to assess the effectiveness ofiOs beyond stricto sensu compliance.
A. Implementation of Advisory Opinions at the Institutional Dimension: An Engine for Change
The organs requesting an AO have always taken action in relation to the Court's pronouncement -mainly in the adoption of resolutions endorsing it.
71 The conduct of the other organs of the 10, on the contrary, demonstrate a less uniform pattern. Accordingly, implementation at the institutional level will result more or less effective depending on the specific features of such a dynamic. In light of the organic structure ofiOs, one can envisage three types of relations: between political organs, between a political and an administrative organ and, finally, between a political and a judicial organ.
Not surprisingly, the relation between political organs allows little room for generalization, since the orientations respectively prevailing in the concerned organs are not necessarily unanimous towards the AO. This is why, in the chain of actions related to the A Os, examples of mutual support come along with instances of disguised avoidance. For instance, a collaborative approach underpinned the implementation of the Namibia AO. Not only the SC and the GA upheld and took prompt follow-up actions, but they also showed support for each other's initiatives taken before and immediately after the pronouncement.
72 Noteworthy, this collaboration proved lasting, as witnessed by the numerous cross references to be found in the relevant GA and SC resolutions expressly following-up the A0. 73 An effective dialogue between the two political organs has not always taken place. In the situation leading to the Admissions and the Competence AOs the Council simply ignored the GA's recommendations for implementation/ 4 implicitly exercising its power of auto-interpretation so as to reject the GA's own interpretation of the AOs. At times, the Council failed to act upon certain pronouncements -the Western Sahara, Nuclear Weapons and Wall AOs being good examples -notwithstanding their relevance for peace and security issues. 75 Predictably, a lack of any clear strategy has either delayed the resolution of the organs' differences in views motivating the recourse to the Court/ 6 or weakened the institutional response to those pronouncements touching upon inter-State issues. Yet this has not meant a complete paralysis of political organs. in furtherance of the cited A Os or otherwise referred to them. For instance, the GA created monitoring procedures/ 7 in charge of certain aspects of follow-up, 78 and eventually established a diplomatic channel with regional actors to counter resistance over implementation.7 9 Alternatively, the relationship between the political and the administrative organs of the requesting 10 has consistently proven successful. Most of the resolutions adopting an AO foresee some form of action by the Secretariat or the highest administrative body of the concerned 10, and this has been the gateway par excellence to realize acts of stricto sensu compliance. 80 The conferral of implementation tasks to administrative bodies has not only obviated the limited operational capacity of political organs, but also made the process of follow-up receptive to changes in the political context surrounding a pronouncement. The practice of the UN offers broad evidence of this. 77 For instance, since 1996, the GA has regularly included the item 'Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court ofJ ustice on the Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons' in its agenda. This item was first included through GA Res. 51/45 of 10 December 1996, Item M, § 6, in which the Court urged the initiation of multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of a "nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination" ( § 4). 78 It suffices to think of the negotiating powers 81 and information gathering competences often given to the SG, 82 not to mention the more complex follow-up mechanisms occasionally set up by the GA. 83 The margin of discretion left to administrative organs has thus made up for the necessarily limited scope of the Court's legal analysis by placing the pronouncement within the operational milieu of the organization.
Against this backdrop, the relationship between the political organs of the requesting IO and the Court is open to numerous observations. 84 One may wish to focus on the reasons underlying the recourse to the Court's advisory competence, 85 to discuss the appropriateness of AOs when political organs lack a shared intention to act in accordance with them or notwithstanding the prospect of having a marginal impact upon a situation through implementation, and so forth. Yet, considerations of the latter kind tend to perceive the Court somewhat indirectly, neglecting its potential role as a player in the phase of implementation. This is why we will leave these aspects aside, while concentrating on the dynamic interaction between the political organs of the requesting IO and the Court. Interestingly, political organs have, inter alia, asked for advice on the legality of certain practices taken in the follow-up to previous AOs. This has allowed the Court not only to enter more profoundly into the life of the requesting organization, but also to address certain fundamental issues of international law outside of its contentious competence. The requests made by the GA in connection with the situation in South Africa well illustrate this point. The first of such requests provided the occasion to frame the powers of the UN under the system of mandates ( 1950 ), while the second and third requests (1955) (1956) ) enabled the endorsement of certain UN practices stretching the organization's powers beyond the pre-Charter framework, while through the last request (1970) the Court could lay down the main features of the right of self-determination and of the UN powers related thereto. 86 As it appears, the follow-up to AOs has been an engine for change in the functioning of the requesting organization vis-a-vis its member States and non-member States. On the one hand, the process of implementation has triggered the development of new practices; 87 while on the other hand, it has paved the way for certain contested practices to fully enter the organization's modus operandi once having received the imprimatur oflegality by the Court. It is noteworthy that the requesting organs have routinely relied on AOs to counter the resistance of recalcitrant third States. So, in the context of the South-West Africa dispute, the GA referred to the relevant A Os to sustain the legality and opposability of certain of its (somewhat dubious) conduct, i.e. simple majority voting, hearings of individual petitions sine altera parte, unilateral termination of the mandate agreement without consulting South Africa.
progress made towards the abandonment of nuclear weapons, including the review of the engagements made by States under regional as well as universal negotiating fora. 89 As it appears, AOs have played in the life of IOs a role far beyond the mere clarification of the applicable law. The phase of follow-up has spurred a cross-fertilization process among organs, leading both to the confirmation of practice taken before the request and to the development of completely new ones.
B. The Relational Dimension in the Implementation of ICJ Advisory Opinions
A pronouncement of the Court inevitably sparks interest among the Member States of the requesting organization. Complete neglect is hardly an option available for any of them, no matter what their specific legal interest in the context might be. Owing to the authoritative position of the Court, its voice will most probably trigger some sort of reaction, be it acceptance or contestation, in its most immediate audience, i.e. member States of the IO's organs. For this same reason, a position of complete rejection will be strategically burdensome, especially for one isolated State seeking to avoid the possible consequences of a pronouncement. 90 Hence, a collection of more or less fragmented claims is likely to coagulate around the pronouncement.
The follow-up on AOs becomes, in a sense, the moment of confrontation among the different claims raised by Member States. In this context, the pronouncement will most probably be hijacked by States in the attempt to support their claims through the legal authority of the Court. This is no novelty in the life of political organs and, as in other instances, it may result in a stalemate if none of the legal views expressed with regard to the pronouncement ultimately succeeds over the other competing one(s). As was very evident, a deadlock occurred in the context of the Western Sahara case. Spain and Morocco, in fact, relied so persistently on sharply different interpretations of the AO as to make any reference to it nugatory, both in their bilateral talks and before the UN organs involved in mediation. 91 Such a fate is, though, not inevitable. In certain cases, AOs have proven successful to obtain a change of conduct or to return to a previously reached understanding. For instance, during the early discussions on the admission of new members to the UN, the SC members had conceded to take a single vote on multiple candidatures. At the time of the Admissions AO, the political situation between the US and the USSR had started deteriorating, making the previous voting practice on admission disadvantageous for the Western front. To avoid this, the western coalition maintained that, since the Court had ruled out single voting on multiple candidatures, the previous practice ought to be changed. 92 Ultimately, the rejection of the USSR sponsored draft resolution qualifies as an instance of follow-up, as a conduct taken in connection with the pronouncement. Yet the independent initiative of member States seems here to play a much more central role than the 10 institutional machinery. If it is so, should one expect any significant difference with in terms of effectiveness?
A tentative answer to this question may be that, in fact, decentralized forms of follow-up tend to pursue a pragmatic accommodation of interests, as in the case of judgments. However, it is important to bear in mind that piecemeal efforts at implementation, which are more concerned with the immediate interests of the parties, can risk undermining the pronouncement itself. To illustrate this point, one may take some of the diplomatic inter-partes initiatives taken in connection with certain AOs. The Good Offices Committee, created to overcome the stalemate in the situation of South-West Africa, annexation. 94 Overall, the active involvement of the 10 may be crucial to balance out the actual or potential results of inter-partes diplomatic initiatives.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We started this survey with the proposition that much had yet to be explored in the implementation of ICJ judgments and advisory opinions through diplomatic means. Indeed, the very notion of implementation needed clarification, covering both judgments and AOs. Finding some sort of 'minimum common denominator' was not only dictated by the scope of research we chose, but was also necessary to select the diplomatic actions which ought to be considered part of the process of implementation, notwithstanding the lack of an immediate practical and theoretical link with compliance. This allowed us to cover follow-up practices highly diverse not only in substance, but also in their effectiveness for pursuing the goals of the participants in implementation. Indeed, implementation often involves a range of subjects broader than its immediate addressees. Both in the case of judgments and of AOs, an institutional component can feature along with an interpartes one.
Admittedly, international organizations are at the forefront when it comes to the implementation of AOs. But they have also played a role in the implementation of binding decisions. In the latter context, lOs have only recently started developing creative mechanisms of implementation, although exploiting little of the rich potential developed throughout the follow-up to A Os. Yet the few cases of intervention in support of States for the resolution of their disputes have proven largely successful, whereas the efforts to implement AOs have been dwarfed by lOs' limited capacity to influence States having a legal interest in a particular matter. While highlighting the relevance of the inter-partes component in implementation, this also suggests that the latter may have a different impact, according to the context in which it is embedded. Mor(! precisely, the close relationship between the parties in connection with a binding decision provides the framework for, and arguably facilitates, the negotiating process of implementation. Even lacking collaboration, the parties will still most probably try to bargain for some pragmatic solution to secure as many as their interests affected by the dispute as possible. On the contrary, in the case of AOs the existence of an inter-partes component may be detrimental for implementation, especially if the requesting 10 has no interest of its own at stake. The States concerned by the pronouncement, in fact, may free-ride on it without retribution, since the web of interests 9 ' 1 GA Res. 1243 of 30 October 1958, around the pronouncement will seem too fragmented for triggering demands of redress by other States. Clearly, this dilutes the effectiveness of the AO, in spite of any genuine implementation effort on the part of the IO.
An inquiry into the topic of the implementation of ICJ pronouncements is to be nourished by a continuous observation of State and institutional practice, coupled with an adjustment of the theoretical categories, in order to fully comprehend implementation. International scholars have so far been reluctant to engage in the latter task, being focused on compliance with binding decisions. This also hides a certain malaise in defining implementation without conflating it with compliance. Yet the old backyard risks turning from well-known and familiar to constraining. On the one hand, the more in-depth the post-adjudicative phase is analyzed, the less compliance itself may be apprehended in a straightforward and definitive way. On the other hand, as awareness of the parameters of implementation is rising in other judicial and non-judicial contexts, the gap concerning the ICJ AOs will soon be necessary to bridge. This contribution was intended to put forward and start a debate on some of these issues. We hope the seeds we have planted will grow and contribute to this end.
